Does Social Media Make a Difference in Political Campaigns?
Digital Dividends in Brazil’s 2010 National Elections

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Abstract
Over the past decade, digital and mobile media have significantly changed the system of political communication in Brazil. An increasing number of Brazilian candidates have begun to use websites and social networking applications as an integral part of their overall campaign efforts. To explore how these "new" media tools are used at all levels of campaigns for national office, we built an original dataset of media use by political campaigns in the 2010 elections in Brazil. We investigate factors such as a candidate's use of web and social networking sites in conjunction with other traditional influences such as incumbency and party affiliation in order to get a robust understanding of the different roles that digital media tools are beginning to play in Brazilian elections. Does digital media provide some competitive advantage to minor party candidates facing off against major party candidates with higher profile and more resources? Do challenger candidates get any electoral advantage against incumbents for using the internet, social media, or mobile media strategies in their campaigning? In almost every instance, the incumbents who lost their office invested less in internet, social, and mobile campaign strategy than other incumbents who won. Winning challenger candidates in every level of government had more aggressive digital media campaigns than losing candidates. Social media strategies particularly using mobile technologies, provided newcomers with electoral advantages. Social networking applications proved particularly important for successful Senate campaigns, and mobile media strategies made a dramatic difference for the lower House of Deputies.

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Introduction

Systems of political communication around the world have significantly evolved over the last decade. The introduction of digital media has given political parties worldwide new tools for logistics and new ways of reaching potential supporters. There is a large body of research on the impact of digital media on campaigns and elections in advanced democracies (Chadwick, 2006; Chadwick and Howard, 2009; Davis, 1999; Foot & Schneider, 2006; Howard, 2006; Xenos &
Foot, 2005), but there have also been important changes to the practices of political campaigning in emerging democracies. Through this study of digital media by political candidates in Brazil’s 2010 elections, we analyze some of the latest trends in order to advance our understanding of how electoral competition has evolved in a developing Latin American democracy with the advent of these new media technologies.

Political life in Brazil has evolved significantly since its period of authoritarianism. Mische (2007) eloquently states that the particular challenge for Brazil has not simply been to allow electoral competition, but to develop a culture of partisanship and party affiliation. Developing democratically, in Brazil’s case, has meant elaborating new projects, repertoires, and institutional forms for political action. Without political parties, citizens would lack the intermediary organizations that buffer relations between the individual and the state. Without some form of partisanship, the competing political forces might polarize to the extent that fragile democratic transitions do not deepen (Mische 2007). Since the privatization of much of the telecommunications industry in 1998, an important part of this new culture of political communication has increasingly involved digital media (Bagchi, Solis, & Gemoets 2003).

Digital Media and the Political Culture of Modern Brazil

Brazil is sometimes thought of as an emerging democracy, but the elections of 2010 demonstrate that democratic institutions are deeply entrenched in that country. This is the sixth round of national elections since the military dictatorship gave way to electoral democracy in 1985. The logistical challenges of administering the vote in a large country of over one hundred million voters are immense, and the electoral laws create interesting opportunities for challenger candidates to win seats—especially in the lower house. Political culture, in an important way, is
highly developed precisely because candidates for office compete rigorously for votes. Campaign dynamics certainly vary by the level of office, but on the whole Brazil is a healthy, functioning electoral democracy. In part this is because television became one of the ways in which political candidates competed for public support beginning with Frenando Collor de Mello’s election in 1989. Television is still the primary media by which citizens have contact with major political figures (Boas 2005). Nonetheless, digital media and social networking applications have become a crucial means by which Brazilians encounter and interact with local, subnational, and national political candidates.

Brazil is particularly interesting for the study of the role of these new media technologies in emerging democracies because it is home to one of the world’s most diverse, vibrant and active online communities. In recent years digital media have played an ever more important role in Brazil's unique system of political communication (Gilmore 2012). Brazil's population is exceptionally mobile, and the roll out of hard line telephone connections exceptionally slow. This has meant that while internet access is an increasingly important part of the media diet for the middle and upper class, mobile telephones have become ubiquitous across the social spectrum. With more than 72 million Internet users, a number that grew by almost 10 million users over the last two years (Internet World Stats, 2010), Brazil houses the fourth largest population of online users and there are no signs of stagnation in its pervasive growth. Additionally, Brazilians are frequently among the top ten national user groups of social media sites such as Twitter and YouTube, representing 4 and 3.5 percent of international users respectively. (All information about international website usage accessed from Alexa at www.alexa.com.) More specifically, Brazilian participation in the social networking site Orkut (52 percent of international users) is unmatched in the world and Facebook (1.3 percent of
international users) has recently begun to take hold despite Orkut’s corner on the Brazilian social networking market. With this growing evidence about how “wired” the Brazilian electorate is becoming, it is increasingly necessary to bridge the gap in research on how this digital activity translates into the political realm.

The 2010 Campaigns in Brazil

On October 3, 2010 Brazil held elections for President, Senate, Governor, and the lower house of Congress, known as the Chamber of Deputies. Certainly a large portion of campaign expenditures for higher levels of office when to purchasing television ads, but the internet was not simply a logical tool for coordinating campaign volunteers. It was used for raising funds for campaign coffers, distributing original political content not found in other media, and data mining. Presidential campaigns are among the most high profile and well resourced. They tend to have aggressive internet, social networking and mobile campaign strategies, and often imitate each other’s campaign innovations. More telling for the study of electoral politics is the character of campaign at the level of Governor, Senate, and Federal Deputy races. It is at these levels that multiple candidates vie for public attention, do innovative things with digital media, and may get some measurable advantage from investments in campaign technology. The use of digital media in political campaigns in Brazil has yet to reach the levels of most developed countries, yet with the Brazilian population’s fascination with these “new” technologies politicians are beginning to scamper to meet the public’s demand. In the array of national electoral races, candidates use digital media tools in varying degrees of sophistication. This is more relevant, however, of the campaigns for presidency, governorships and for the Senate than for the lower house of Congress or for state and local elections.
In the campaigns for the presidency, digital media is ubiquitously used and wielded with high levels of sophistication as the candidates are able to afford not only web developer teams who put together highly interactive websites and the like, but they also tap into teams of content producers who work around the clock to keep their respective candidates’ online presence “fresh” for the voting public. On the one hand, they hire teams of video producers around the country who crafted a wide range of distinct campaign videos on a daily basis for posting on the candidates’ web, YouTube, Facebook and Orkut sites. On the other hand, they have teams whose sole purpose is to manage each candidate’s social media sites and who work tirelessly to fill candidate pages with constant updates, blogposts and tweets around the clock. These new media teams are highly educated and try to outdo each other in a number of creative ways throughout the campaign season. For instance, Worker’s Party candidate Dilma Rousseff’s new media team went as far as to set up a Facebook-style social media site called Dilmaweb where ideally campaign team members would network with a wide array of political allies including other Workers’ Party candidates, community organizers, bloggers, voters, as well as voters themselves in order to better coordinate their on-the-ground campaigns. In contrast, the digital media team for Green Party candidate, Marina Silva, created and highly promoted their interactive community organizing application called “Case de Marina” on the candidate’s website where supporters and organizers could register their own address as one of Marina’s “casas” (houses) and then locate other similar residences in their vicinity in order to facilitate neighborhood networking and organizing.

At the level of races for governor and senate, the pervasive use of digital media for campaigns was similar to their presidential hopefuls, with 97 percent of all viable candidates having at least a basic form of online campaign presence, but the online campaigns themselves
were nowhere near as sophisticated. In contrast to the diverse and interactive websites of the presidential candidates, websites for governor and senate candidates tended to be more informative than interactive. In some cases, candidates even preferred to use free blog sites such as Wordpress to house their official campaign websites and in one case, a sure-of-himself incumbent senator decided against building an official candidate website, and relied solely on social media for his online campaign presence. The use of social media sites was also pervasive in these races, but opening an Orkut or Facebook account or page is a different matter than actively and strategically using it for campaign purposes. Overall, 97 percent of all senator and governor candidates had some form of social media or micro-blogging presence on the web, however, in the case of Facebook (54 percent of users), for example, only about 20 percent of candidates updated their page on a daily basis and only about 30 percent posted anything more than simple text-only messages. In the case of Twitter, which was used by more than 90 percent of all governor and senate candidates, daily use was better than with Facebook, but still only 60 percent of candidates “tweeted” on a semi-regular basis.

In the case of the lower house of the Brazilian congress, the story was quite different, principally because of the system by which candidates are elected. Specifically, the races for all 513 seats in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies are tied to one of the 26 states or the Federal District and not to small districts within states where only a choice few candidates would compete for single seats. In other words, each state has a long, unstructured list of candidates from all participating parties who compete amongst themselves for the entire allotted amount of seat available in the lower house. According to Samuels (2001b), this makes for candidate centric campaigns where competition is fierce and everyone is seeking innovative ways to set themselves apart from the pack of candidates.
In the 2010 elections, one example of this type of candidate differentiation stood above the rest. In the state of São Paulo where there was already an overpopulated pack of 1,169 candidates competing for 70 seats, a famous children’s entertainer decided to run in his clown-type costume and under his stage name of Tiririca as a way of both mocking the electoral system and setting himself apart from his competitors. Tiririca quickly became well known for strange campaign tactics including a series of campaign ads featuring the candidate in clown costume acting silly manner. All of these ads quickly went viral on YouTube and coupled with Tiririca’s dynamic online campaign, including an interactive website and a popular Twitter feed, he was not only able to set himself apart from his competitors, come election day he was the top vote getter both nationally and more importantly in his home state of São Paulo. Tiririca, however, was but one of many candidates who employed strange or unorthodox campaign strategies. Another widely known campaign gimmick featured Rosemar Luiz da Rosa Lopes from the state of São Paulo who changed his candidate name to Rosemar Barack Obama and used the slogan “Sim você pode” (Yes you can) in all of his campaign propaganda to try and draw on the American president’s international popularity for his own political gains. Alternatively, the YouTube videos of two women from the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo went viral for very different reasons. The candidate videos featuring Mulher Melão (Melon Woman) and Mulher Pera (Pear Woman), named these ways for either their physical resemblance to the fruit or the fruit’s resemblance to a specific body part they possessed, were widely reposted and tagged because of the way they used their sex appeal to attempt to win votes. For the most part, however, campaign antics such as these—with the obvious exception of Tiririca—were not what carried the day at the polls on October 3, 2010. According to Ames, Baker and Rennô (2008), Brazilian voters have historically tended to vote on the issues and therefore seek out candidates
that best represent their own interests. It was those who were able to effectively communicate their campaign positions to voters—albeit in a memorable way—who had the best chance in setting themselves apart in the minds of the voting public. Another advantageous way to do this was through the use of savvy digital media campaigns.

According to Gilmore (2012), Candidates for the lower house who chose to use digital media tools for their campaigns provided voters—who were frequently overwhelmed with an unwieldy pack of candidates to chose from—with avenues by which to find out more information about a given candidate and their political positions. Digital media tools were further advantageous to candidates due to their low usage among candidates at this level. Unlike at the level of senator or governors where 97 percent of all candidates used digital media for their campaigns, only 40 percent of candidates nationwide for the lower house had any form of online campaign presence. Candidate websites, by and large, had simple structures and tended to have only a few pages of information on the candidate. Only a choice few has url addresses could be quickly associated with candidate’s name or party, whereas the majority included the name of the free blog site where they constructed the site. Social media sites were even less commonly used, with only 31 percent of candidates, and there was no real consistency in how they were used. Orkut was the most commonly used site, yet only 13 percent of candidates had a strong presence on this particular social media site. Candidates’ second choice was Facebook, yet only 10 percent of candidates even had a presence on the social media site and of that 10 percent, less than 20 percent regularly updated their pages. The exception for the lower house races was Twitter, which was used by almost 30 percent of candidates. In fact, Twitter was used in a very distinct manner than the other social media tools online, specifically because it provided candidates with a sort of hypodermic needle connection with voters through its easy connection
on voters’ mobile devices. Twitter allowed candidates the ability to feed voters with bite-sized bits of information into voter mobile devices that they could then take into the voting booths with them. This was specifically useful because of the fact that voters had to remember the candidate’s four-digit candidate or “urn” numbers in order to vote for them (Gilmore, 2012). Because of this function, the bulk majority of candidate tweets in the last days building up to the elections contained only the candidate’s name and their “urn” number, which could then be used as a sort of mobile and digital crib sheet that would remind voters of how to vote for a specific candidate.

**Data and Methods**

All analysis for the current study is drawn from an original dataset created during a month-long field visit to Brazil which tracks the political use of digital media tools for the top 69 viable gubernatorial candidates, the top 84 viable senatorial candidates and from a randomly sampled set of 1,000 candidates for the lower house of the Brazilian Congress in the 2010 national election held on October 3, 2010. In the case of gubernatorial and senatorial campaigns, only candidates who were seen as viable contenders for their respective seats were selected. Viability was determined by identifying all candidates who were performing well in the polls leading up to the races. Candidates in the case of the lower house of Congress were proportionately selected from all 26 Brazilian states as well as the Federal District, which is treated as a state during national congressional races. This portion of the dataset, therefore, represents roughly 20 percent of the 5,283 viable candidates nationwide competing for the 513 total open seats in the lower house of the Brazilian Congress. Such a large sample was chosen because it allowed for each state, regardless of size, to have a sufficiently large representation of candidates in the final
dataset. Candidates were then selected in a three-part process. First, we determined the percentage of congressional seats allotted to each individual state. That percentage was then used to determine the amount of candidates that would be sampled from each state’s pool of candidates. For example, the states of Goiás and Minas Gerais are allotted 3 percent and 10 percent of the total seats in the lower house of Congress respectively; therefore 30 candidates were selected from Goiás and 100 for Minas Gerais. Finally, we randomly sampled these sets of candidates from the official, and publicly available, list of viable candidates for each state from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court website, Brazil’s official electoral commission (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, n.d.).

Demographic and campaign information about each individual candidate including age, gender, party and coalition affiliation, and campaign spending, was also collected from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court website. The study population was comprised with a significantly larger male (83%) population than female. Age of the candidates was recorded in years and ranged from 21 to 87 ($Mdn = 48, SD = 11.08$). Because candidates hailed from one of 28 distinct political parties, “party affiliation” as a variable was recoded into three categories: small (30%); medium sized (45%); and large (25%) parties. In addition, a candidate’s coalition affiliation was coded into one of four categories: unaffiliated (26%); in a coalition with other small or medium parties (27%); in a coalition with the two minor of the four large parties (10%); and in a coalition with one of the two top parties (37%).

All data linked to an individual candidate’s campaign web presence were collected during the final two weeks of campaigning before the national election on October 3, 2010. All searches for candidate web pages were conducted on Brazil’s top search engine (google.com.br) and consisted of two steps. First, the candidates’ full names were entered into the search engine along
with the state they were running in. Second, if there were no results for candidate websites, a second search was conducted where the candidates’ urn (candidate) names and electoral numbers were entered into the search engine. These methods were chosen in order to emulate the experience an everyday Brazilian might have in searching for any given political candidate online. In each search, the first four pages of results were examined in-depth in order to identify whether or not the candidate had a campaign website. Furthermore, because many candidates used free blog sites such as Wordpress or Blogger for their main campaign web presence, blogs in these cases were also coded as websites. These sites also helped in identifying if candidates used any social media sites as well for campaign purposes because in many cases links to these sites were clearly apparent on the candidates’ home pages. In cases where there were no links to social media sites or when candidates were found to not have a campaign website, separate searches were conducted for each candidate on the following social media sites: Twitter, Facebook, Orkut and YouTube. The final outcome variable measured whether or not the each candidate won their respective election. Data for this variable was collected from the final election tallies from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court website (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, n.d.).

Digital Media and Electoral Advantage

Studies of electoral advantage and political communication in other countries recommend two reasonable questions for understanding contemporary political culture in Brazil. In some countries, it has been suggested that digital media provides minor parties with some electoral advantage against major parties. Candidates from minor parties may have smaller campaign budgets, and being unable to pay for ads in television and radio broadcast, may find the internet
an effective way to marshall unexpected resources. Sometimes, minor parties may do surprisingly well given their relative lack of resources. Similarly, candidates who have never held office may have a better chance of beating an incumbent if they can effectively use social media to activate their social networks on election day.

Such electoral advantages may be particularly valuable in countries dominated by a single, large, entrenched political party. Although Brazil is not a one-party government, there are a set of complex coalitional relations between parties that make for a complex political landscape. In 2010, there were three influential candidates for President, 69 viable candidates for Governor, 84 candidates for Senate, and 6015 candidates for Lower House. In the context of Brazil, there are four “Major Parties” which are the largest and most influential political parties. They include the PSDB, DEM, PMDB and former President Ignacio Lula da Silva’s Workers Party, the PT. Furthermore, all other parties, including those who hold a minor share of political seats in the Brazilian Congress as well as those that are new or up-and-coming, can be best defined as being “Minor Parties” in comparison to the largest four. To search for contrasts between the varied ways a campaign may choose to use digital media in their strategy, we make three distinctions. Internet campaign strategies include a candidate’s use of an official website. Because candidates across the races used self-produced websites and free blog sites similarly, we made no distinction between blog sites and official websites unless there was a marked differentiation in their use. Social Media campaign strategies included a candidate’s use of any of three distinct social media sites including Facebook, YouTube and the widely popular Orkut. Finally, Mobile Media campaign strategies included a candidate’s use of the micro-blogging site Twitter which was the most frequently used non-official website for campaign purposes.
Does digital media provide minor parties with some electoral advantage?

To explore these questions we first contrasted the winning and losing candidates, at several levels of competition, by party size and digital communication strategy (See Table 1). This table reveals that for Major Party candidates, the vast majority of those who won their race, across all levels of office, were likely to have integrated digital media into their overall campaign strategies. The contrast between winners and lowerers was particularly stark for winning candidates for Governor, who used social and mobile media much more than their opponents, winning candidates for Senator who used social media much more than their opponents, and winning candidates for the Federal House of Deputies who used internet, social and mobile media much more than their opponents.

Furthermore, all of the winning governors who had the backing of minor parties had successful internet, social and mobile media strategies. Senators from minor parties who won office had better organized social media campaigns than losers. For federal deputies, the contrast between winners and losers is most stark: Winning minor party candidates invested in internet, social, and mobile media campaigns significantly more than their opponents. Altogether, elections winners seemed to have invested more in internet, social, and mobile media strategies than their opponents. But in particular, sophisticated use of social media like Facebook and Orkut was an important part of the success of Senate campaigns, and mobile media strategy made a dramatic difference for anyone running for Federal Deputy.

As we can see in Table 1, use of digital media in the governor and senate races, the use of digital media was all but ubiquitous. In the case of the lower house of Congress, however, the disparities are quite apparent. In the case of Major party candidates, 88 percent of winning
candidates had at least some form of digital media campaign presence, usually also paired with a mobile media strategy. Losing candidates, by contrast, had generally weak digital media strategies. Even though a digital media strategy might seem to be a cost effective way for minor party candidates who cannot afford major television ads to reach their supporters, minor party candidates were slightly less invested in digital media strategies. Overall, the most important components of digital media strategy were having a dedicated URL and activating support networks with mobile phones. Social media was important for many of the winning campaigns, but not as ubiquitous as the other two kinds of digital campaign tools.

**Does digital media provide newcomers with some electoral advantage?**

We then contrasted impact of digital media use in campaigns between challenger and incumbent candidates across three levels of elected office (See Table 2). In total, 1153 candidate campaigns were studied. Of these, 118 were incumbents seeking reelection. Being an incumbent often means having the advantage of patronage networks and an experienced campaign team.

**TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**

Table 2 shows that in almost every instance, the incumbents who lost their office invested less in internet, social, and mobile campaign strategy than other incumbents who won. The most notable exception concerns the use of mobile media by incumbents for Senate, for whom such investments may not have contributed much to victory. For challenger candidates—often people new to electoral politics—using digital media was particularly important. Indeed, winning challenger candidates across in every level of government, and especially at the level of lower House of Deputies, tended to have more aggressive digital media campaigns than losing
candidates. Overall, the evidence here suggests that digital media tools offered both incumbent and challenger candidates with a clear competitive advantage.

Conclusion

In the present study we have argued that the Brazilian political campaign sphere is a recently ripe atmosphere in which to study the use of new media technologies for campaign purposes. According to Gilmore (2012), this is specifically true because Brazilian politicians are still discovering the potential that “new” technologies have in political campaigns. The present research, however, points to but a new facet of an old art form. In Brazil specifically, political campaigns are multifaceted endeavors, which are affected by a number of influences. For instance, Samuels (2001a) argues that incumbents hold a unique advantage in Brazilian elections. This is true at all levels of elections, but specifically at the level of the lower house of Congress because they are rarely challenged head on by a newcomer candidate. Challenger candidates then, tend to establish new niches where there is either no presiding incumbent or they seek ways to trim off voters from a number of established niches. Scholars (Benoit and Marsh 2010, Samuels 2001c, Samuels 2002) have noted, however, that new candidates face an uphill battle in generating enough votes and have traditionally had to rely heavily on generating campaign funding in order to forge new niches and gain enough name recognition in the already saturated electorate market. Digital media then, as we have illustrated, is a new tool that can help bridge this gap in part and can provide challenger candidates an inexpensive, if not free, option that can help them establish new constituencies.

Alternatively we have illustrated how digital media can have an impact in leveling the playing field for smaller political parties. Affiliation with certain political parties has
traditionally lent considerable legitimacy to a given candidate’s campaign. Specifically, candidates from larger parties have tended to reap increased legitimacy in the minds of the voting public (Ames, Baker, and Rennó 2008). For instance, in the 2010 elections, 55 percent of candidates elected to office in the race for the lower house of Congress came from one of the four largest parties (PT, PSDB, DEM, PMDB) while 45 percent came from the other 22 political parties. With 28 distinct parties nationwide to choose from in most every state race, certain parties tend to enjoy higher voter recognition, and therefore legitimization, than others. In an attempt to address this imbalance, however, many parties join political coalitions as a way of increasing their legitimacy to the voting public (Ames 2001). In the late 90s and early 2000s specifically, coalitions were seen a legitimate way for smaller party candidates to borrow legitimacy from the larger, more established, political parties and were argued to be an influence on election outcomes (Ames 2001). Over the past decade, however, coalitions have become more the rule than the exception and therefore may not be leveling the playing field quite as much as they once did, leaving smaller party candidates to find new and innovative ways establish their individual legitimacy in the eyes of the Brazilian voting public. And while digital media campaigns by no means replace the immediate legitimacy that an association with powerful parties may have, they do provide candidates with new ways of engaging with voters directly and without having to rely on the massive party machinery to forge their own constituency.

Finally, the findings in the present study point to the differential in how distinct types of digital sites can have on a candidate’s performance on election day. The findings in the present study then suggest that certain Internet sites can be better suited for political campaign purposes than others and that this most likely varies depending upon the political and electoral systems, as well as culture. Specifically we illustrate how having a mobile media campaign on a site such as
Twitter is a more strategically beneficial tactic than using more traditional social media sites such as Facebook and Orkut. These findings suggesting that perhaps tools that are more pervasive, or to a certain extent *invasive*, in the lives of the voting public, are specifically well suited for populations where mobile phone use is as extensive as in the case of Brazil. Additionally, these findings also suggest that different cultures may consume their politics through distinct types of media and that no site alone is best suited for campaign purposes across the globe. Overall, however, the evidence presented here supports the argument that social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook are fostering new styles of conversation between candidates and voters and that these new connections can play a central role in shoring up voter support.
References


Table 1: Winning and Losing Candidates in Brazil 2010, by Race, Party Size, and Campaign Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Major Party (Winners/Losers)</th>
<th>Minor Party (Winners/Losers)</th>
<th>All Parties (Winners/Losers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governor</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>95/91</td>
<td>100/95</td>
<td>96/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media</td>
<td>90/71</td>
<td>100/90</td>
<td>93/81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Media</td>
<td>100/86</td>
<td>100/95</td>
<td>100/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senator</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>94/89</td>
<td>95/82</td>
<td>94/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media</td>
<td>82/63</td>
<td>85/64</td>
<td>80/63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Media</td>
<td>85/84</td>
<td>91/91</td>
<td>87/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal Deputy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>88/38</td>
<td>80/28</td>
<td>84/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media</td>
<td>45/17</td>
<td>43/9</td>
<td>44/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Media</td>
<td>82/33</td>
<td>67/21</td>
<td>75/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Internet</td>
<td>91/47</td>
<td>86/31</td>
<td>89/35</td>
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<td>Social Media</td>
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<td>57/13</td>
<td>61/16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile Media</td>
<td>86/42</td>
<td>76/24</td>
<td>82/29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Brazil 2010 election.
Table 2: Challengers and Incumbents in Brazil 2010, by Race, Party Size, and Campaign Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbents (Winners/Losers)</th>
<th>Challengers (Winners/Losers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governor</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>92/100</td>
<td>100/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media</td>
<td>100/80</td>
<td>87/81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Media</td>
<td>100/100</td>
<td>100/89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senator</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>94/71</td>
<td>95/91</td>
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<td>Social Media</td>
<td>91/57</td>
<td>89/65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Media</td>
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<td>92/87</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Federal Deputy</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>80/67</td>
<td>89/29</td>
</tr>
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<td>Social Media</td>
<td>43/37</td>
<td>45/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile Media</td>
<td>67/54</td>
<td>84/23</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>93/33</td>
</tr>
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<td>Social Media</td>
<td>58/47</td>
<td>63/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Media</td>
<td>73/67</td>
<td>89/27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Brazil 2010 election.
Endnotes